Viewpoint | Personal Data and the Internet of Things:It is time to care about digital provenance. by Pasquier, Thomas et al.
                          Pasquier, T., Eyers, D., & Bacon, J. (2019). Viewpoint | Personal Data and
the Internet of Things: It is time to care about digital provenance.
Communications of the ACM, 62(6), 32-34. https://doi.org/10.1145/3322933
Peer reviewed version
License (if available):
Other
Link to published version (if available):
10.1145/3322933
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the accepted author manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via ACM at https://doi.org/10.1145/3322933 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
Viewpoint | Personal Data and the Internet of Things
It is time to care about digital provenance.
Thomas Pasquier
University of Bristol
David Eyers
University of Otago
Jean Bacon
University of Cambridge
ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things promises a connected environment reacting
to and addressing our every need, but based on the assumption that
all of our movements and words can be recorded and analysed to
achieve this end. Ubiquitous surveillance is also a precondition for
most dystopian societies, both real and fictional. How our personal
data is processed and consumed in an ever more connected world
must imperatively be made transparent, and more effective tech-
nical solutions than those currently on offer, to manage personal
data must urgently be investigated.
The need for greater transparency
We have all read market predictions describing billions of devices
and the hundreds of billions of dollars in profit that the Internet
of Things (IoT) promises.1 Security and the challenges it repre-
sents [27] are often highlighted as major issues for IoT, alongside
scalability and standardisation. In 2017, FBI Director James Comey
warned, during a senate hearing, of the threat represented by a bot-
net taking control of devices owned by unsuspecting users. Such a
botnet can seize control of devices ranging from connected dish-
washers,2 to smart home cameras and connected toys, not only
using them as a platform to launch cyber attacks, but also poten-
tially harvesting the data such devices collect.
In addition to concerns about cybersecurity, corporate usage of
personal data has seen increased public scrutiny. A recent focus of
concern has been connected home hubs (e.g., AmazonAlexa, Google
Home).3 Articles on the topic discussed whether conversations
were being constantly recorded and if so, where those records went.
Similarly, the University of Rennes faced a public backlash after
revealing its plan to deploy smart-beds in its accommodation to
detect “abnormal” usage patterns.4 A clear question emerges from
IoT-related fears, “how and why is my data being used?”
As concerns grow, legislators across the world are taking action
in order to protect the public. For example, the recent EU General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which took effect in May 2018,5
and the forthcoming ePrivacy Regulation6 place strong responsi-
bility on data controllers to protect personal data, and to notify
users of security breaches. The EU commission defines a Data Con-
troller as the party that determines the purposes for which, and
the means by which, personal data is processed (why and how the
1https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2017/12/10/2017-roundup-of-
internet-of-things-forecasts/#94d9f6c1480e
2https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7240
3https://www.wired.com/2016/12/alexa-and-google-record-your-voice/
4http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2017/09/07/le-crous-de-rennes-annule-une-
experimentation-de-lits-connectes-dans-une-cite-universitaire_5182434_4408996.
html
5http://www.privacy-regulation.eu/en/index.htm
6https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/proposal-eprivacy-regulation
data is processed). EU regulations further impose constraints on
where EU citizens data can be processed and what type of data
(i.e., “special category” data falls under more stringent constraints).
The data controller must provide means for end users to determine
whether their data is properly handled and means to effect their
rights. Overall, there must be mechanisms to determine what data
is processed, how, why and where.
Such concerns have drawn researchers to look at means to de-
velop more accountable and transparent systems [10, 24]. The prob-
lem has also been clearly highlighted by the EU Data Protection
Working Party: “As a result of the need to provide pervasive services in
an unobtrusive manner, users might in practice find themselves under
third-party monitoring. This may result in situations where the user
can lose all control on the dissemination of his/her data, depending
on whether or not the collection and processing of this data will be
made in a transparent manner or not.”
Indeed, modern computing systems contain many components
that operate as black boxes; they accept inputs and generate out-
puts but do not disclose their internal working. Beyond privacy
concerns, this also limits the ability to detect cyber-attacks, or more
generally to understand cyber-behaviour. Because of these concerns
DARPA, in the US, launched the Transparent Computing project7
to explore means to build more transparent systems through the
use of digital provenance with the particular aim of identifying
advanced persistent threats. While DARPA’s work is a good start,
we believe that there is an urgent need to reach much further. In the
rest of the article, we explore how provenance can be an answer to
some IoT concerns and the challenges faced to deploy provenance
techniques.
Digital Provenance
There is a growing clamour for more transparency, but straightfor-
ward, widespread technical solutions have yet to emerge. Typical
software log records often prove insufficient to audit complex dis-
tributed systems as they fail to capture the complex causality rela-
tionships between events. Digital provenance [8] is an alternative
means to record system events. Digital provenance is the record of
information flow within a computer system in order to assess the
origin of data (e.g., its quality or its validity).
The concept first emerged in the database research community as
a means to explain the response to a given query [16]. Provenance
research later expanded to address issues of scientific reproducibil-
ity, notably by providing mechanisms to reconstitute computational
environments from formal records of scientific computations [23].
More recently, provenance has been explored within the cybersecu-
rity community [25] as a means to explain intrusions [18] or more
recently to detect them [14].
7https://www.darpa.mil/program/transparent-computing
Provenance records are represented as a directed acyclic graph
that shows causality relationships between the states of the objects
that compose a complex system. As a consequence, it is compati-
ble with automated mathematical reasoning. In such a graph, the
vertices represent the state of transient and persistent data items,
transformations applied to those states, and persons (legal or natu-
ral) responsible for data and transformations (generally referred to
as entities, activities and agents respectively). The edges represent
dependencies between these entities. The analysis of such a graph
allows us to understand where, when, how, by whom and why data
has been used [7, 9].
An outcome of research on provenance in the cybersecurity
space is the understanding that the capture mechanism must pro-
vide guarantees of completeness (i.e., all events in the system can
be seen), accuracy (i.e., the record is faithful to events) and a well-
defined, trusted computing base (i.e., the threat model is clearly
expressed) [22]. Otherwise, attacks on the system may be unde-
tected, dissimulated by the attacker or misattributed. We argue
that in a highly ad hoc and interoperable environment with mutu-
ally untrusted parties, the provenance used to empower end users
with control and understanding over data usage requires similar
properties.
Who to trust?
In the IoT environment the number of involved stakeholders has
the potential to explode exponentially. Traditionally, a company
managed its own server infrastructure, maybe with the help of a
subcontractor. The cloud computing paradigm further increased
complexity with the involvement of cloud service providers (some-
times stacked, e.g., Heroku PaaS on top of the Amazon IaaS cloud
service), third party service providers (e.g., CloudMQTT) and other
tenants sharing the infrastructure. The IoT further increases this
complexity, with potentially ad hoc and unforeseen interactions
between devices and services on top of the complex cloud and edge
computing infrastructure most IoT services rely on.
One answer to this problem is to build applications in “silos”
where the involved parties are known in advance, but as a side-
effect locking-in devices and services to a single company (e.g., the
competing smart-home offerings by leading technology companies).
This is far from the IoT vision of a connected environment, but
most existing products fall in this category. There are obviously
major business considerations behind this model, and it should be
noted that the EU GDPRmandates for some form of interoperability
(although it is yet unclear how it should be interpreted [12]).
An alternative to such “lock-in” would be to make devices’ con-
sumption of data transparent and accountable. If data is exchanged
across devices, the concerned user should be able to audit its us-
age. However, in an environment where arbitrary devices could
interact (although it must be remembered that EU GDPR requires
explicit and informed user consent), how can trust be established
in the audit record? This requires an in-depth rethinking of how
IoT platforms are designed, potentially exploring the security-by-
design approach based on hardware roots of trust [13] to provide
trusted digital enclaves in which behaviour can be audited and
to encourage some form of “accountability-by-design” principles
where transparency and the implementation of a trustworthy audit
mechanism is a core concern in product design.
Such solutions have been explored in the provenance space, for
example, by leveraging Software Guard Extensions (SGX) prop-
erties to provide a strong guarantee of the integrity of the prove-
nance record [4]. Similarly, remote attestation techniques lever-
aging Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware have been pro-
posed [6] to guarantee the integrity of the capture mechanism.
However, how to provide such guarantees in an IoT environment,
where such hardware features may not be available, is a relatively
unexplored topic.
Where does the audit live?
The fully realised IoT vision is of vast distributed and decentralised
systems. If we assume trustworthy provenance capture is achiev-
able, the issue of guaranteeing that the provenance record can be
audited remains. If you are to audit the processing of personal data,
guarantees about the integrity and availability of the provenance
record must exist. If you agreed to share your daily activity for
research, the activities of insurance companies scraping your data
for possible health risks must not be able to masquerade as benign
research use, nor should data collection for political purposes be
able to pass as harmless entertainment, as in the Cambridge Ana-
lytica scandal.8 Similarly, the availability (durability) of the audit
record must be guaranteed. There is no point to an audit record if
it can simply be deleted.
Further, Moyer et al. evaluated the storage requirements of prove-
nance when used for security purposes in relatively modest dis-
tributed systems [21]. In such a context, several thousands of graph
elements can be generated per second and per machine, resulting in
a graph containing billions of nodes to represent system execution
over several months. It is unclear how some past research outcomes:
e.g., detection of suspicious behaviour [2], privacy-aware prove-
nance [11] or provenance integrity [15]; scale to very large graphs
as such concerns were not evaluated. Similarly, while blockchain
is heralded [19] as an integrity-preserving means to store prove-
nance, it is unclear how well it could expand to such scale. Several
options have been explored to reduce graph size, such as identi-
fying and tracking only sensitive data objects [5] or performing
property-preserving graph compression [17] however none has yet
adequately addressed the scalability challenge.
How to communicate information?
Means must be developed to communicate about data usage, but
also about the risks of inference from the data. Not only must
the nature of the data be considered, but also other properties
such as the frequency of capture [3]. For example, a 100Hz smart
meter reading can in some cases indicate what television channel is
currently being watched; even a daily average reading could inform
about occupancy. Here, it is important to be able to explore and
represent the outcome of complex computational workflow [1].
Provenance visualisation has been an active research topic for
over a decade, yet no fully satisfactory solution has been proposed.
The simplest possible visualisation is to render the graph, however
8https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-
campaign.html
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beyond trivially simple graphs such a representation is too com-
plex and dense to be easily understood, even by experts. We go
further and suggest that educational background, socio-economic
environment and culture may play a part in how interpretable such
information is.
In order to make the accountability and transparency of IoT plat-
forms effective, a better communication medium must be provided.
An approach often taken is to analyse motifs in the graph to extract
high-level abstractions (e.g., Missier et al. [20]), meaningful to the
average end-user. In recent work [26], it was proposed to represent
such a high-level abstractions as a comic strip.
We need to care about digital provenance
Building transparent and auditable systems may be one of the
greatest software engineering challenges of the coming decade. As a
consequence, digital provenance and its application to cybersecurity
and the management of personal data has become a hot research
topic. We have highlighted key active areas of research and their
associated challenges. It is fundamental for industry practitioners to
understand the threat posed by the black-box nature of the IoT, the
potential solutions, and the challenges to a practical deployment
of those solutions. Accountability-by-design must become a core
objective of IoT platforms.
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